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Is Turn About Fair Play? Copyright Law and the Fair Use 
of Computer Software Loaded Into RAM 
Chad G. Asarch 
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions. But 
laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the 
human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as 
new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and manners and opin­
ions change, with the change in circumstances, institutions must advance 
also to keep pace with the times. We might as well require a man to wear 
still the coat which fitted him when a boy . . • . 
-Thomas Jefferson (first head of the U.S. Patent Office)1 
INTRODUCTION 
Computer systems, especially those in heavy-use commercial set­
tings, often require routine maintenance to continue functioning prop­
erly. Many businesses turn to an independent service organization 
("IS0")2 to provide computer maintenance services because ISOs fre­
quently charge less than the original equipment manufacturer ("OEM") 
for those services.3 The tremendous growth in computer use4 has 
spawned a multi-billion dollar computer maintenance industry in the 
1 .  Inscription at the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C. 
2. An ISO, also known as a third party maintainer, is a company that services and 
repairs computers that it did not manufacture. 
3. Most computer users cannot afford to hire full-time employees to provide rou­
tine maintenance or handle emergency repairs. See Richard H. Stem, Section II7 of the 
Copyright Act: Charter of the Software Users' Rights or an Illusory Promise?, 7 W. 
NEW ENG. L. REv. 459, 479-80 (1 985); Trinnie Arriola, Note, Software Copyright In· 
fringement Claims After MAI Systems v. Peak Computer, 69 WASH. L. REv. 405, 424 
(1 994). Although ISOs also may offer other services such as consulting, this Note fo. 
cuses only on the issues invdlved in the use of software associated with computer repair 
and maintenance. 
4. At least one well-known commentator, however, predicts that computer use will 
diminish in the future as the public realizes that computers do not offer services people 
actually want and instead really represent "the biggest fraud in the world." "You can 
have 3,000 newspapers" on-line on a "computer for $9,000," but for "half a dollar" 
you can buy a newspaper and get the same information in a portable format that can be 
taken "wherever you want to go. You can't take a computer to the toilet ." Jackie 
Mason, Love Thy Neighbor (live monologue, Apr. 20, 1 996), quoted in Taking a P.C. to 
the Toilet, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 21, 1 996, at E6. 
654 
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United States,5 and ISOs and OEMs have become engaged in fierce 
competition for this computer service business.6 
The struggle between ISOs and OEMs to capture this expanding 
market has spilled over into the courts, spawning a number of recent 
decisions in the area of copyright law that have added significant legal 
consequences to the mechanics of computer operation and maintenance. 
In particular, the Ninth Circuit in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, 
Inc.1 ruled that, for purposes of the Copyright Act,8 loading software 
into a computer's active memory - known as Random Access Memory 
("RAM" )9 - from a permanent storage device such as a hard disk, dis­
kette, or Read Only Memory ("ROM" )10 results in the making of a 
"copy" of the software.11 A user engages in "copying" under the Act 
by making a "fixed" copy of a copyrighted work.12 Concluding that 
software stored in RAM is "sufficiently permanent" to be perceived 
and used by the computer, the court in Peak held that software loaded 
into RAM constitutes a "fixed" copy of the original stored in perma­
nent memory.13 
5. Recent reports estimate that businesses in the United States spent over $23 bil­
lion on computer support and maintenance in 1995. See Dinah Zeiger, Keeping Those 
Bits in Line: Computer Repair Business Growing More Competitive, DENV. POST, Jan. 
29, 1996, at C l. 
6. See id. at C l  (predicting that "the already huge computer service, maintenance, 
and repair industry will only get bigger and more fiercely competitive as more personal 
computers are installed in businesses and homes"). 
7. 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). 
8. 17 u.s.c. §§ 101-710 (1994). 
9. See RICHARD T. CHRISTOPH & GLENN T. SMrnI. COMPUTER LITERACY 42-
44 (2d ed. 1993). 
. 
10. All computers rely on some form of long-term memory to store software and 
data. A computer continues to store items in this permanent memory regardless of 
whether the computer is turned on or off. See V. CARL HAMACHER ET AL .• COM­
PUTER ORGANIZATION (3d ed. 1990); JAMES V. VERGARI & VIRGINIA V. SHUE, 
FUNDAMENTALS OF COMPUTER-HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW (1991). 
11. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518. 
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
13. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994)). The court rested 
its conclusion on the finding that software, particularly MAI's operating software, could 
be utilized to perform the software's intended functions while in RAM. See 991 F.2d at 
518. The court in Peak was the first to hold that the loading of software into a com­
puter's RAM creates a copy of the software under the Copyright Act. See 991 F.2d at 
519. 
The court in Peak did not determine how long a copy had to be in RAM in order 
to be considered fixed. However, the court in Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI 
Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 363 (E.D. Va. 1994), suggested that more than a momen­
tary, fleeting existence in RAM is required for making a fixed copy. Courts in subse­
quent decisions also have held that an ISO makes an infringing copy even if only part 
of the software is copied into RAM. See, e.g., Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express 
Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) [hereinaf-
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The Peak decision has serious ramifications for an ISO's ability to 
· compete in the computer service market because an ISO generally must 
load or "copy" software into RAM when servicing computers. The 
simple act of turning on a computer requires the activation of the com­
puter's operating software, which is designed to make the computer per­
form its most basic functions.14 Operating software includes both oper­
ating system software15 and utility or diagnostic software.1 6 A computer 
must store its software in some form of permanent memory.17 However, 
in order to use items stored in permanent memory, the computer must 
load the software into RAM: software remains inert until copied into 
RAM where it can be processed by the computer hardware.18 Because 
ter Triad J], modified, 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995) [hereinafter Triad JJ], cert. denied, 
116 S. Ct 1015 (1996). 
14. See CmusTOPH & SMITII, supra note 9, at 113-20; STEPHEN A. WARD & 
ROBERT H. HALsTEAD, JR., COMPUTATION STRUCTURES 348-49 (1990); see also 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dis­
missed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). Computers operate by executing the commands issued 
by a computer program. See Christian H. Nadan & James W. Morando, How Courts En­
courage Standardization and Interoperability, COMPUTER LAW., Apr. 1993, at 12, 13. 
The Copyright Act defines a "computer program" as a "set of statements or instruc­
tions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain re­
sult" 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). 
15. Operating system software manages the internal functions of the computer and 
allows the computer to translate application programs that perform specific tasks, such 
as word processing, into language the computer can understand, making use of the ap­
plication software possible. See CHRISTOPH & SMITII, supra note 9, at 113-20; see 
also Computer Assocs. Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544, 549-50 (E.D.N.Y. 
1991) (observing that "[o]perating systems are the programs that manage the resources 
of the computer and allocate those resources to other programs that need them"), affd., 
982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992). For example, IBM computers use either Disk Operating 
System ("DOS"), Operating System 2 ("OS/2"), or UNIX software as their operating 
system software. See CHRISTOPH & SMITII, supra note 9, at 115-20. Microsoft Win­
dows software is not an operating system; it is a "software environment" that functions 
like an applications program. See id. Macintosh computers utilize a specialized systems 
program that incorporates many of the functions of Microsoft Wmdows into the operat­
ing software. See id. 
16. Utility, diagnostic, or other computer service software often is designed to lo­
cate computer errors. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 113-15. Some utility 
software programs automatically display an error log upon being loaded into RAM in 
order to inform the user of any problems. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 518. Utility software is 
usually bundled together with operating system software so that loading of the operating 
system software into RAM from the permanent memory source in which it is stored 
necessarily involves loading the utility software. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 
9, at 114. 
17. See id. CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 80. 
18. See id. at 113-20. No matter how the operating system might be permanently 
stored (i.e. in ROM, hard disk, or diskette), a computer cannot function unless the oper­
ating system is loaded into the computer's RAM because the operating system manages 
the computer's physical resources and orchestrates the execution of all programs. Thus, 
a computer's operating software is loaded automatically into RAM as soon as someone 
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even the lowest-level computer maintenance involves turning on the 
computer and testing it to make sure that the computer functions prop­
erly, 19 effective computer maintenance requires loading the operating 
software into RAM. 20 
Under the Copyright Act, a copyright infringement claim must sat­
isfy two eJements: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) unautho­
rized "copying" of copyrighted material.21 In Peak, the OEM had li­
censed copyrighted software22 to the computer owner (the "customer") 
under a restrictive licensing agreement that allowed the customer to use 
and copy the software during the normal operation of the computer but 
prohibited the making of any copies of the software by nonlicensed par­
ties.23 As a result, the court held that any copying of the software by the 
turns on the computer. See Arriola, supra note 3, at 407; Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at 
*5 (noting that "[i]n order to use a Triad computer, one must reproduce the operating 
system software in the computer's RAM"); Advanced Computer Servs. of Mich., Inc. v. 
MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 360 (E.D. Va. 1994) (observing that "[r]egardless of 
the means of loading, none of the [computer] programs can communicate with the com­
puter unless they are first loaded into RAM"). 
19. See, e.g., Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *5. In addition, proper maintenance 
often requires making archival copies on disk or tape in order to ensure that information 
stored on the computer is not lost during maintenance (i.e., when the computer is 
reformatted or rebooted after it has been serviced). See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *6. 
20. See Katrine Levin, Note, MAI v. Peale Should Loading Operating Software 
into RAM Constitute Copyright Infringement?, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 649 
(1994). 
21. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991); 
Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1162 
(9th Cir. 1977). 
22. Under the Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, computer programs 
clearly are entitled to copyright protection as literary works. See 17 U.S. C. §§ 101, 117 
(1994). Of course, an OEM bringing a copyright infringement claim against an ISO 
must establish actual ownership of a valid copyright by showing that the software is 
original and that the OEM complied with the applicable statutory formalities. See Lotus 
Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 813 n.S (1st Cir. 1995), affd. by an 
equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 (1996); Engineering Dynamics, Inc. v. Structural 
Software, Inc., 26 F.3d 1335, 1340 (5th Cir. 1994). For the purposes of discussion, this 
Note assumes that the OEM has proven ownership of a valid copyright of the software 
in question. 
23. A representative software license used by MAI (the OEM in Peak) provided in 
part: 
. 
(a) License • • • .  Customer may use the Software . .. solely to fulfill Customer's 
own internal information processing needs on the particular items of Equipment 
(b) Customer Prohibited Acts . • • .  Any possession or use of the Software .. . not 
expressly authorized under this License or any act which might jeopardize 
[MAl]'s rights or interests in the Software . . .  is prohibited, including without 
limitation, examination, disclosure, copying, modification, reconfiguration, aug­
mentation, adaptation, emulation, visual display or reduction to visually percepti­
ble form or tampering. 
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IS024 without the permission of the OEM occurred "beyond the scope 
of the license"25 and therefore constituted copyright infringement.26 
A "Peak claim" arises when: (1) an OEM transfers computer op­
erating software to a customer under a restrictive licensing agreement, 
and (2) an ISO copies the software into RAM without the OEM's per­
mission or "beyond the scope of the license" while servicing the com­
puter.27 In other words, any third party makes an infringing "copy" of 
licensed operating software simply by turning on the customer's com- · 
puter without the OEM's permission. The Peak decision has widespread 
significance given the growing trend among OEMs28 to license rather 
than transfer ownership of software to customers.29 
MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 517 n.3 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. 
dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). The terms of the license in Peak are typical of many 
such restrictive licensing agreements in the software industry. 
24. In Peak, personnel employed by Peak Computer (the ISO) copied operating 
system software and diagnostic/utility software into RAM by turning on the computer 
while servicing MAI customers. See 991 F.2d at 517-19. The ISO then used the 
software, which automatically generated an error log when copied into RAM, to iden­
tify and correct system errors. See 991 F.2d at 517-19. 
25. 991 F.2d at 517-19. The Copyright Act grants a number of exclusive rights to 
the holder of a copyright, including the exclusive right to make and distribute "copies" 
of the copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994). The owner of a copyright may 
transfer these rights to others under an exclusive license. See 17 U.S.C. § 20 l{d) (1994). 
A user infringes on the rights granted to a copyright holder by making or distributing 
copies of the copyrighted material without the permission of the copyright owner when 
such copying occurs be yond the scope of a license. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 50l(a) 
(1994); SOS, Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989). 
26. See Peak, 991 F.2d at 517-19. 
27. See-991 F.2d at 517-19. 
28. Most OEMs own the copyright to the operating software that runs the com­
puters sold by the OEM. See Levin, supra note 20, at 678 n.167. Although the software 
developer, copyright holder, and OEM may be separate entities, generally the same en­
tity that manufactures a computer also will produce and hold the copyright to the oper­
ating software for that computer. 
29. The practice of licensing rather than selling software is common across the in­
dustry. See Albert P. Cefalo, Software Licensing, in TECHNOLOGY LICENSING AND 
LmGATION: 1994, at 385 (PLI Pat Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property 
Course Handbook Series No. 382, 1994) (providing a list of different license types). 
The licenses often prohibit the customer from allowing others to use the software for 
any purpose, including computer maintenance. See Appellants' Brief at 5, Triad II, 64 
F.3d 1330. In fact, MAI began employing restrictive licenses specifically as a way to 
limit competition in the computer service market from Peak Computer. Peak Computer 
enticed four MAI employees, including MAi's customer service manager, to work for 
Peak Computer. Peak Computer subsequently convinced a large percentage of MAI cus­
tomers to switch over to Peak Computer for computer maintenance services. See Brian 
J. Murphy, Case Note, Loading Software into RAM Creates a "Copy": MAI Systems 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 10 SANTA Cl.ARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. LJ. 499, 
500 (1994). In response, MAI hired a leading computer service consultant to regain its 
lost share of the service market. The consultant recommended that MAI sue to enjoin 
Peak Computer from servicing MAI computers. The consultant suggested that MAI 
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In a Peak situation, an OEM has two separate potential causes of 
action: (1) a breach of contract claim only against the customer, and (2) 
a copyright infringement claim against the ISO - a Peak claim. Al­
though this Note only addresses the copyright claim, a brief comparison 
of the two causes of action will help clarify the scope of the copyright 
claim. The breach of contract claim arises because the customer violates 
the terms of the license by allowing the ISO or any other unauthorized 
third party to use the software.30 The OEM cannot bring a breach of 
contract claim against the ISO because the ISO is not a party to the re­
strictive licensing agreement. In contrast, the OEM can bring a copy­
right claim only against the ISO and not against the customer because 
any copying performed by the customer does not occur "beyond the 
scope of the license. "31 The ISO only infringes on the copyright when 
the ISO performs the copying. Thus, no copyright cause of action ac-
bring a copyright infringement action and argue to the court that loading software into 
RAM constituted "copying" under the Copyright Act, a course of action which ulti­
mately proved successful. See Levin, supra note 20, at 650. This note uses the term 
"sales" to mean sales of licenses, rather than sales of copies of the software in the § 
117 sense. See infra note 31 (noting that the analysis would be different if customers 
were owners of copies of the software, instead of licenses). 
30. Although no court has held that a customer's actions constitute a breach of 
contract, such a result is an obvious conclusion based on the terms of the license. How­
ever, aside from the financial impediments to bringing numerous individual breach of 
contract suits against customers, it is uhlikely that an OEM would actually pursue litiga­
tion against its own customers given the strong probability that doing so would drive 
away those customers in droves. See also infra note 122 (discussing the antitrust issues 
raised by such a breach of contract claim). 
31. In addition, the Peak ruling does not affect customers who own, rather than 
hold licenses to, software. § 117 of the Copyright Act allows for "owners" of copies of 
computer programs to make copies of the program provided "(1) that such new copy or 
adaptation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program ... 
or (2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only." 17 U.S.C. § 117 
(1994). Because copying a computer program into RAM is essential in order to use the 
software, an ISO would not violate copyright law by loading the software into RAM if 
§ 117 covered software held by a customer under a restrictive license agreement. How­
ever, in a one-sentence footnote, the court in Peak dismissed the applicability of a § 117 
defense to a Peak claim by ruling that users of licensed software "do not qualify as 
'owners' of the software and are not eligible for protection under § 117." Peak, 991 
F.2d at 518 n.5; see also Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. 
Supp. 356, 367 (E.D. Va. 1994). Some commentators have argued that "rightful posses­
sors," including licensees, should be covered under the exemptions in§ 117. See, e.g., 
Michael E. Johnson, Note, The Uncertain Future of Computer Software Users' Rights in 
the Aftermath of MAI Systems, 44 DUKE LJ. 327, 341-47 (1994). Recent legislation 
has been introduced by Rep. Joseph Knollenberg (R-MI) to include rightful possessors 
as owners under§ 117. See H.R. 533, 104th Cong. (1995). Nevertheless, because Con­
gress actually replaced the term "rightful possessor" with the word "owner" when 
drafting the legislation, it is likely that courts will be reluctant to extend§ 117 to right­
ful possessors, including licensees. 
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crues where the customer allows the ISO to use the software while ser­
vicing the computer as long as the customer activates the computer and 
loads the software into RAM.32 
These problems would be avoided if the courts considered the 
ISO's use of a computer's operating software "copied" into RAM to be 
a "fair use" of the software.33 Under section 107 of the Copyright Act, 
a user may create copies of a copyrighted work without violating the 
Copyright Act if the user's activities constitute a "fair use. "34 The stat-
32. The court in Triad I suggested that no copyright infringement would occur 
where the customer starts up the computer before the ISO arrives or where an ISO rep­
resentative instructs the customer "to start up or reset the computer whenever necessary 
to perform various service functions." Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 
No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994). Thus, an ISO 
would not violate copyright law by borrowing the customer to tum on the computer and 
punch the necessary keys to boot up the service software because any copy made by the 
customer would be permitted under the license. But see Advanced Computer Servs., 845 
F. Supp. at 367 (holding that the customer/licensee infringes on the copyright by permit­
ting third party access to the software). 
33. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *6-*7. Application of the fair use defense to 
a Peak claim would not affect the OEM's potential breach of contract claim against the 
customer. 
34. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). Courts also have recognized the defense of copy­
right misuse to prevent the inappropriate expansion of the limited monopoly created by 
the copyright. See Lasercomb Am., Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1990); see 
also 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGIIT 
§ 13.09[A] (1995). As a result of the recent Fifth Circuit decision in DSC Communica­
tions Corp. v. DGI Technologies, Inc., 81 F.3d 597 (5th Cir. 1996), some commentators 
have argued that misuse might be applicable to Peak cJaims. See Mark Walsh, High 
Tech Firms Cheer Ruling in Copyright Case: Court Says Software Makers Can't Misuse 
Law to Create a Monopoly, THE RECORDER, May 29, 1996, at 1, 12. The court in DSC 
Communications applied copyright misuse to invalidate an OEM's attempt to use copy­
right protection to prevent third parties from developing competing microprocessor 
cards. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 601-02. When competitors tested the alter­
native microprocessing cards for compatibility with an OEM computer's switching sys­
tem, the cards automatically downloaded the OEM's copyrighted operating software 
into the computer's RAM. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 599, 601. 
However, the misuse defense generally is limited to situations where a copyright 
holder attempts to use copyright protection to prevent others from developing alterna­
tive works that compete with the original. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra, § 13.09[A]. 
As a result, courts routinely have rejected copyright misuse as a valid defense for an 
ISO against a Peak claim because the plaintiff OEMs' licensing agreements have not in­
cluded restrictions designed to prevent ISOs from developing competing software. See 
Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1337 (9th Cir. 1995); Data 
Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1147, 1169-70 (1st Cir. 1994); In 
re lndep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1541-42 (D. Kan. 1995) (find­
ing no copyright misuse where the OEM does not prohibit a third party from develop­
ing its own diagnostic software); Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 366-67; 
Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *14. The Fifth Circuit in DSC Communications focused 
on the OEM's attempt to prevent its competitors from developing alternative 
microprocessor cards, rather than on any effort to stymie competition in the computer 
service market. See DSC Communications, 81 F.3d at 601. Consequently, courts em-
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ute directs courts to weigh four factors in determining whether a partic­
ular use is fair: (1) the purpose of the use, (2) the nature of the copy­
righted work, (3) the amount of the work copied, and ( 4) the effect of 
the use upon the market for the copyrighted work.35 However, a precise 
definition of what qualifies as a fair use so far has eluded courts and 
commentators.36 Instead, courts have characterized the fair use defense 
as an equitable doctrine that turns on a determination of the specific 
facts involved in a given copyright infringement case. 37 Although the 
Ninth Circuit in Peak did not address the issue of fair use, courts in 
subsequent rulings have concluded that ISOs cannot rely successfully 
on the fair use defense against a Peak claim.38 
This Note argues that the fair use defense should be applied to 
ISOs charged with copyright infringement under a Peak claim. Part I 
maintains that the four fair use factors identified by Congress in the 
Copyright Act support a finding of fair use in Peak claims, primarily 
because an ISO's computer maintenance activities do not impact ad­
versely the market for sales of computer software. Part II contends that 
equity and policy considerations support application of the fair use de­
fense to Peak claims. Specifically, Part II reasons that preventing an 
ISO from successfully raising the fair use defense against a Peak claim 
would grant OEMs the ability to exclude ISOs from the computer ser­
vice market simply by licensing rather than selling operating software 
to their customers. While an OEM should be able to license software to 
its customers, an OEM should not be able to use copyright protection 
improperly to acquire a de facto monopoly in the computer maintenance 
market. 
ploying the reasoning in DSC Communications would not apply the copyright misuse 
defense to Peak claims because they only involve competing services, not the develop­
ment 'of competing computer hardware or software. See Walsh, supra, at 12. 
35. See 17 U.S. C. § 107 (1994). 
36. See, e.g., NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05; American Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 
65-66 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S. C. C.A.N. 5659, 5679 (noting that "no generally ap­
plicable definition [of fair use] is possible")). 
37. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 471 U.S. 539, 560 
(1985) (citing· H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C. C.A.N. 
5659, 5679 (stating that "each case raising the question must be decided on its own 
facts")); see also NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05. 
38. Courts have considered the fair use defense in two cases involving Peak 
claims. In both cases the courts found that an ISO defending against a Peak claim did 
not have recourse to the fair use defense because of the commercial nature of the use 
and the ISO's failure to pay royalties to the OEM. See Triad II, 64 F.3d 1330; Advanced 
Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. 356. 
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This Part argues . that the fair use defense should be available to 
ISOs against a Peak claim because the four statutory fair use factors,39 
particularly the market impact factor, on balance weigh in favor of fair 
use. Section I.A discusses market impact, the most important of the four· 
factors,40 and contends that an ISO's use of software does not nega­
tively impact the market for software sales because the use is non­
proliferative. Section I.B submits that despite the commercial nature of 
an ISO's use of the software, the purpose of the use does not weigh 
against fair use because it lacks any negative impact on the market for 
sales of the software and because copying only serves as an intermedi­
ate step to an otherwise fair use. section I.C postulates that the nature of 
the copyrighted work supports fair use because operating software is a 
functional work41 subject to less protection under copyright law. Finally, 
section I.D maintains that while the software is completely copied into 
RAM, the reality of computer operations offers the ISO no alternative 
but to copy the entire work in order to use it. Therefore, the extent of 
the copying factor also should not weigh against fair use. 
A. Market Impact 
The Copyright Act directs courts to consider "the effect of the use 
upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work"42 in de­
ciding fair use claims. This section argues that market impact supports 
fair use because ISOs do not compete with OEMs for sales of the 
39. See supra text accompanying note 35 (listing the four factors). 
40. See Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 238 (1990); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 
566 (characterizing whether the use tends to interfere with sales of the copyrighted arti­
cle as "the single most important factor" bearing on whether the use is fair); Triad Sys. 
Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *8 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 18, 1994); Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 780 F. 
Supp. 1283, 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affd., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992); see also 
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05(AJ(4]; BRUCE A LEHMAN & RONALD 
H. BROWN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND nm NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRA­
STRUCTURE: REPORT OF nm WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 79 (1995) (noting that "courts have repeatedly identified [the economic effect 
of the use] as the most significant of the four factors"). But see American Geophysical 
Union, 60 F.3d at 926 (interpreting the omission of language highlighting the priority of 
the market impact factor in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1171 
(1994), as an indication that all four fair use factors should be considered equally); 
William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presumptions, and 
Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. J. 667, 693-97 (1993) (criticizing the Supreme 
Court's emphasis on market impact). 
41. Fair use analysis distinguishes between works that serve a functional, utilita­
rian purpose and more creative works. See infra text accompanying notes 98-111. 
42. 17 u.s.c. § 107(4) (1994). 
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software and because an IS O's use of the software to service customers' 
computers is nonproliferative: the ISO does not create any permanent, 
additional copies of the software. Section l.A.1 contends that the rele­
vant market should include only the sales of copies of the software and 
should exclude pot�ntial licensing fees. Section l.A.2 maintains that an 
ISO's use of licensed software while servicing computers does not neg­
atively impact the relevant market. 
1. Defining the Relevant Market: Excluding Potential Licensing Fees 
The relevant market in a Peak claim should be the market for sales 
of the OEM's software. Potential licensing revenues from computer 
maintenance should not be included in the relevant market because do­
ing so in effect would extend copyright protection to the process of ser­
vicing computers - an uncopyrightable procedure. 
Before an analysis of the market impact of a given use can begin, 
a court must define the parameters of the potential market in question.43 
When defining the relevant market, courts focus their analysis on 
whether the disputed use would diminish demand for the original copy­
righted work.44 Thus, the appropriate inquiry is whether the challenged 
use "supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted work"45 
or whether "it fulfills the demand for the original."46 Specifically, in 
order to protect the incentives established by copyright law - to en­
courage authors to bring copyrighted works to the market in the first 
place- courts determine whether the challenged use would have a det­
rim�ntal effect on the potential market for the copyrighted work "by di­
minishing potential sales, interfering with marketability, or usurping the 
market" if the use became widespread.47 
43. Indeed, defining the potential market remains the central question of any mar­
ket impact analysis. See Daniel M. Wall & Charles S. Crompton, III, The Antitrust and 
Intellectual Property Law Issues: Exploiting Computer Software Copyrights in Multiple 
"Markets," 8 ANTITRUST, Summer 1994, at 20. 
44. See Fisher v. Dees, 794 F.2d 432, 438 (9th Cir. 1986). 
45. Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983). 
46. Fisher, 794 F.2d at 438; see also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation 
Enterps., 471 U.S. 539, 550 (1985) (holding that the fair use doctrine is designed to pre­
clude uses that "supersede the use of the original") (quoting Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 
342, 344-45 (No. 4,901) (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)); Pacific & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 
1490, 1496 (11th Cir. 1984); Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432, 1438 
(S.D.N.Y.), affd., 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, 
§ 13.05[B][4] (noting that courts investigate whether the disputed use satisfies "the 
same purpose" or performs the same "function" as the copyrighted work). 
47. Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523 (9th Cir. 1992) (ci­
tation omitted); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1164, 1177 
(1994); Sega Enterp., Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (arguing 
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An average layperson considering the issue for the first time might 
conclude intuitively that potential licensing fees should be included in 
the relevant market by reasoning as follows: assuming that loading 
software into RAM constitutes copyright infringement, certainly the 
ISO should pay the OEM for any actual use the ISO makes of the 
software after it has been copied into RAM. An OEM should be able to 
collect permission fees from an ISO just as a wrench manufacturer 
should be able to collect fees from a plumber who uses the wrench to 
service pipes because both the OEM and the wrenchmaker would ex­
pect to sell additional copies of their products to everyone who uses 
them. Similarly, OEMs have argued that denial of the fair use defense 
is necessary in order to insure that OEMs recoup the cost of creating 
the operating software either by forcing ISOs to purchase licenses to 
use the operating software or by reaping the profits that would be gen­
erated by having the OEMs perform the maintenance themselves - the 
obvious consequence of preventing ISOs from entering the market.48 
These positions seem bolstered by the fact that an ISO makes extensive 
use of the operating software in RAM while servicing a customer's 
computer. For example, while utility software generally does not fix 
computer problems, ISOs often rely on utility software to generate error 
logs and to identify and diagnose system problems.49 
However, the layperson's and the OEMs' arguments focus on the 
wrong issue by confusing protection against unauthorized use with pro­
tection against unauthorizf!d copying.50 Their reasoning mistakes the 
that one need only show that the challenged use would diminish the copyrighted work's 
potential market to negate a claim of fair use) (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568). 
48. See Appellee's Brief on the Merits at 26-28, Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern 
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995). 
49. In Peak, the software loaded into RAM permitted a user "to view the system 
error log and diagnose the problem with the computer." MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Com­
puter, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994). 
However, if the software actually fixed a computer's problems by itself, there would be 
no great need for ISOs to service the computer. 
50. In fact, there are two separate distinctions that elude the layperson. The first 
distinction is between "use" and "copying." Although the copying of the software 
from ROM to RAM is technically a "use" for infringement purposes, it is not the 
"use" for which the customer pays the ISO. The customer pays the ISO to service the 
computer; this "use" of the software to service the computer, once the copy is already 
in RAM, is not an infringement This Note refers to "use" in the latter sense. 
The second distinction deals with the way in which the copying and use are "un­
authorized." The use (in the servicing-computers sense) is unauthorized for the cus­
tomer as a matter of contract law - the contract is the license agreement between the 
OEM and the customer. Therefore, because the ISO is not privy to the license agree­
ment, the use (in the servicing-computers sense) is not "unauthorized" for the ISO. On 
the other hand, because the ISO's copying of the software from ROM to RAM is a po­
tential copyright infringement, the copying is unauthorized for the ISO as a matter of 
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scope of the licenses at issue in a Peak claim, which prohibit third-party 
use of the software, with the reach of copyright law. Copyright law pre­
vents the creation of an alternative market for copies of copyrighted 
works by parties other than the copyright holder. Such protection pro­
vides copyright holders with a legitimate expectation of income from 
the sale of copies of the work, but does not create any expectation of 
gain from a third-party's use of the work. Protecting against unautho­
rized uses of an item like a wrench is the province of patent law, not 
copyright law. Thus, the relevant market under fair use analysis should 
include only the market for additional copies of the work, not the mar­
ket for uses of the work. This is why, when determining whether the 
fair use defense applies, courts have distinguished between copying that 
constitutes "simple exploitation of another's creative efforts" and copy­
ing incident to the use of the copyrighted material - only the former 
being prohibited by copyright law.51 
Both the layperson and the OEM err by concluding that the use of 
the copy of software in RAM detracts from the value of the original, 
thereby treating the creation and use of a copy of software in RAM the 
same as making copies of a newspaper article on a Xerox machine for 
use instead of the original. By doing so, they fail to recognize the 
unique characteristics of copying software into RAM. An item loadf'.d 
into RAM is an "ephemeral" copy that only exists in RAM for as long 
as the computer is turned on while the original remains permanently 
stored in some form of long-term memory.52 When the computer is 
copyright law, unless the use is deemed a fair use. See supra notes 30-32 and accompa­
nying text. 
51. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1523. For example, the Supreme Court in Campbell 
looked favorably on application of the fair use defense to the use of lyrics and music 
copied from Roy Orbison's licensed and copyrighted classic rock ballad "Oh, Pretty 
Woman" in a rap music parody recorded by 2 Live Crew. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Mu­
sic, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). The Court limited the market impact analysis to an 
investigation of whether sales of 2 Live Crew's version of the song would negatively 
impact sales of copies of the original:See 510 U.S. at 590-92. In other words, the Court 
ruled that the proper inquiry should focus exclusively on the question of whether buy­
ing 2 Live Crew's "copy" of the original would disincline consumers to buy Orbison's 
version, not on whether the band's unauthorized use of the lyrics and music adversely 
affected permission fees collected by the copyright holders. If no one purchasing the 2 
Live Crew song would have bought the Orbison original anyway, then no negative mar­
ket impact would have resulted from 2 Live Crew's use of the copied lyrics despite 2 
Live Crew's unauthorized use of the licensed work. See 510 U.S. at 591-92. 
52. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 43-44. Indeed, commentators have 
sharply criticized the ruling in Peak for completely misconstruing the meaning of the 
term "fixed copy." See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 31, at 334 (arguing that because a 
computer program in RAM is "a transitory and ephemeral writing, like a message writ­
ten in sand," it should not be considered "fixed in the same way a program copied onto 
permanent, read-only memory (ROM) is") (internal quotation marks omitted). Conclud-
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turned off, the infonnation in RAM is erased.53 Because software only 
can be used in RAM, copying software into RAM does not create a 
real, additional copy of the software that can be used instead of the 
original, unlike copies of, say, a newspaper article that can serve as a 
substitute for the original. 
In addition, the market impact of a given use should be gauged 
only for the potential market of the copyrightable product, not the mar­
ket for related but uncopyrightable activities.s4 Processes, functions, and 
uses are not copyrightable.ss In particular, the process of servicing a 
computer, even when such a process relies on the use of copyrighted 
software, is not copyrightable.56 Alternatively, one can copyright 
ing that software in RAM represents a "fixed" copy of the same software in ROM or 
on a hard disk is similar to ,arguing that a person's shadow represents a copy of that per­
son because it can be seen around the corner before the person comes into view. More­
over, Peak's detractors point to the House Report that accompanied the 1976 Copyright 
Act to show that Congress did not intend for software in RAM to be considered fixed. 
See H.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5666 (stating 
that the "definition of fixation would exclude from the concept purely evanescent or 
transient reproductions such as those projected briefly on a screen . . . or captured mo­
mentarily in the 'memory' of a computer"). 
53. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 43-44. 
54. See Marcus v. Rowley, 695 F.2d 1171, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983). 
55. "In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship ex­
tend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or em­
bodied in such work." 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
The Copyright Act does grant copyright holders copyright protection on works de­
rived from the work with the original copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994); NIMMER 
& NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A][4]. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work 
as "a work based upon one or more preexisting works . . .  or any other form in which a 
work may be recast, transformed, or adapted." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994). However, a de­
rivative work must meet the same standards as an original work to receive copyright 
protection. See 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1994). Thus, processes, even if derived from a copy­
rightable work, do not qualify as derivative works subject to copyright protection. 
56. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 
WL 446049, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994) (stating that because the OEM's "copy­
rights do not extend to the methods, procedures, and processes involved in servicing" a 
computer manufactured by the OEM, injury to the OEM's "position in the service mar­
ket is not c;ognizable under copyright law"); see also H.R REP. No. 94-1476, at 57, re­
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5670 ("Section 102(b) is intended, among other 
things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the [computer] programmer is the 
copyrightable element in a computer program, and that the actual processes or methods 
embodied in the program are not within the scope of copyright law"). OEMs do not de­
serve copyright protection over the process of servicing computers when such service 
involves the use of copyrighted diagnostic software despite the substantial investment of 
time, money, and labor they may have put into the development of the software. The 
Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 490 U.S. 340 (1991), 
rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine and held that substantial effort alone cannot 
confer copyright status on an otherwise uncopyrightable work. 
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software designed to perform a diagnostic service, but one cannot copy­
right the process by which one uses the software because computer 
maintenance is a process without authorship. Thus, the only relevant 
market courts should consider is the market for sales of the software, 
the sole market in which an ISO could usurp the demand for the copy­
rightable work. Courts should not include in the relevant market the 
business of servicing computers and the potential licensing fees that 
would be generated by requiring ISOs to pay for the use of licensed 
software. 
Copyright protection does not provide any expectation of recoup­
ing software development costs from computer maintenance activities, 
regardless of .how the OEM wishes to recover those costs. OEMs can 
recover the cost of development by charging higher prices for copies of 
their software, but should not be able to recoup those costs through ser­
vice contracts by operation of copyright law. As a result, the software 
price would reflect its true cost instead of forcing the customer to pay 
part of the cost of the software through the OEM's higher service rates. 
The two courts that have considered the application of the fair use 
defense to a Peak claim disagreed with this analysis.57 The court in 
Advanced Computer Services of Michigan v. MAI Systems Corp. ruled 
that an ISO's maintenance of computers running on licensed software 
"clearly deprives" the OEM of license fees associated with the use of 
that software and, thus, necessarily diminishes the market value of the 
software license agreements.58 Similarly, the court in Triad II found that 
the ISO diminished the potential market for sales of licenses for the 
utility software because the ISO would have to purchase a license for 
the software in order to use it.59 
However, by assuming that ISOs should be included as potential 
licensors of the software, these decisions rest on the faulty reasoning 
that a potential market has been supplanted "to the extent that the 
defendant, by definition, has made some actual use of plaintiff's work, 
which use could in turn be defined as the relevant potential market. "60 
57. Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1336-37 (9th Cir. 
1995); Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 (E.D. 
Va. 1994). 
58. 845 F. Supp. at 366. OEMs also would point out that in cases of duplication of 
the copyrighted work, the court may presume a negative market impact if the use of the 
work is wholly commercial. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
593 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 
(1984) (holding that a commercial use creates a rebuttable presumption of negative mar­
ket impact). 
59. See Triad II, 64 F.3d at·l337. 
60. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A][4]. 
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Under the rationale employed in Advanced Computer Services and 
Triad II, a contested use of a licensed work always would cause a nega­
tive market impact because a copyright holder always could charge li­
censing fees to the user for the contested use. Thus, including unautho­
rized users in the market of prospective software licensors automatically 
establishes negative market impact in every fair use case because the 
plaintiff always can claim the loss of a potential market "if that poten­
tial is defined as the theoretical market for licensing the very use at 
bar. "61 Given the extreme importance courts place on market impact, 
this reasoning would lead to different fair use decisions depending on 
whether the work was licensed or sold. Copyright holders effectively 
could preclude recourse to the fair use defense by potential users of 
copyrighted works simply by licensing those works. A magazine could 
always claim lost permission fees for copies of articles made by a 
teacher to distribute to her students simply by licensing each copy of its 
weekly issue,62 thereby creating a negative market impact and possibly 
denying the fair use defense to the teacher.63 However, the relevance of 
the fair use defense to a particular use does not depend on whether the 
copyrighted work is licensed or sold because the Supreme Court has 
found no negative market impact stemming from the use of a licensed 
work.64 
61. Id. One commentator has noted that "by definition every fair use involves 
some loss of royalty revenue because the secondary user has not paid royalties." Pierre 
N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1 105, 1 124 (1990); see 
also American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 n.17 (2d Cir. 1994); 
William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1661 , 
1671 (1988). 
62. Licensing each copy of a magazine through shrink wrap licenses would require 
little effort. Shrink wrap licenses, already heavily utilized in the software industry, oper­
ate by sealing the copyrighted work with a label informing the customer that by open­
ing the package or wrapper and breaking the seal they agree to the terms of the license. 
See Committee Report: Division III-Copyright, in ABA SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & 
COPYRIGHI' LAW, REPORT 181 (1987). 
63. The Copyright Act specifically designates such an educational use by a teacher 
as a probable protected fair use. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994). 
64. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994). The Court . 
noted that while a copyright holder could assert harm to the potential market for li­
censes of the work, the appropriate inquiry remains "the harm of market substitution." 
510 U.S. at 593. But see Richard Anderson Photography v. Brown, No. 85-0373-R, 
1990 U.S. Dist LEXIS 19846, at *5 (W.D. Va. Apr. 16, 1990) (holding that "use of 
photographic images used without license was not fair because such use denied the 
[copyright holder] licensing fees which clearly affects the value of the copyrighted 
work"). However, in Richard Anderson Photography, the challenged use involved the 
creation and distribution of additional, proliferative copies of the photographs in ques­
tion. The analysis would have been the same regardless of whether the pictures had 
been sold or licensed. 
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Including potential licensing fees in the relevant market would 
have the practical effect of extending copyright protection to the un­
copyrightable process of servicing the computer. A copyright violation 
occurs in a Peak claim only because the software is copied into RAM 
by the ISO. Indeed, if the customer and not the ISO performed the cop­
ying, no copyright infringement would occur and the OEM would be 
unable to bring a Peak claim against the ISO, even though the ISO does 
the same task for the customer.65 
Moreover, because an ISO's use of the software does not interfere 
with any legitimate expectation conferred by the operation of copyright 
law that the OEM has regarding income from the market for copies of 
the copyrightable software, 66 courts should not include the market for 
royalties from use of the software as part of the relevant market. Even 
in American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., where the court consid­
ered potential licensing fees when evaluating market impact, the court 
confined its analysis by concluding that "[o]nly an impact on potential 
licensing revenues for traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed 
markets should be legally cognizable. "67 The court defined traditional 
markets as those that the copyright holder has "typically sought to, or 
reasonably been able to obtain or capture. "68 In addition, the court only 
considered markets for additional copies of the work, not for simple use 
of the work.69 Because the copying in a Peak claim does not create ad­
ditional, usable copies of the software, including licensing fees in the 
relevant market would subvert the purpose of the market impact analy­
sis - defining and guarding" markets appropriately subject to copyright 
protection. 
In Peak claims, the market for licensing fees from ISOs to service 
computers is neither part of the traditional or normal market, which 
consists of the market for software sales, nor part of the market pro­
tected by copyright because the use of the software occurs as part of the 
uncopyrightable process of servicing computers. Even if one could ar-
65. See supra notes 31-32. 
66. When analyzing market impact, the equitable goals of the fair use doctrine call 
for striking a balance between the public benefit derived by permitting the disputed use 
and the personal gain to the copyright owner that will result from denying the use. See 
MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 183 (2d Cir. 1981). The less impact a disputed use 
will have on the copyright holder's legitimate expectations of personal gain from own­
ership of the copyright, the "less public benefit need be shown to justify the use." 677 
F.2d at 183. 
67. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994); 
see also Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 1996 
U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-17 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1996) (en bane). 
68. 60 F.3d at 930. 
69. See 60 F.3d at 916-17. 
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gue that licensing fees for an ISO's use of the software while servicing 
computers is part of a traditional market because OEMs bring copyright 
infringement suits against ISOs, there is still a high level of "circularity 
to the problem: the market will not crystallize unless courts reject the 
fair use argument . . .  but, under the statutory [fair use] test, [a court] 
cannot declare a use to be an infringement unless" there is already a 
market in existence "to be harmed. "70 A potential licensing market that 
is either "unrealized" or "cumbersome" to enforce should not be in­
cluded in the relevant market.71 In a Peak claim, the potential market 
for licensing fees only exists after the court denies the fair use defense, 
not before, and thus should not be included in the relevant market be­
cause it is an "unrealized" market. 
Evidence of lost permission fees should not bear on a court's mar­
ket impact analysis. Indeed, a copyright holder's ability to obtain per­
mission fees is precisely what is at issue when examining the fair use 
defense.72 Courts should avoid the circular reasoning that concludes that 
a use is unfair, and that a user should therefore be required to pay per­
mission fees to the copyright holder, simply because the copyright 
holder is otherwise deprived of a fee by applying the fair use exception 
to a claim of copyright infringement.73 The court must find that a user's 
70. 60 F.3d at 937 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
71. See 60 F.3d at 939 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
72. See Princeton Univ. Press v. Michigan Document Servs., Inc., No. 94-1778, 
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *85 (6th Cir. Nov. 8, 1996) (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
73. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *84-88 (Ryan, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that "[i]t is circular to argue that a use is unfair, and a fee therefore 
required, on the basis that the publisher is otherwise deprived of a fee"). Although the 
en bane majority opinion rejected the "circularity" argument, the court limited its con­
sideration of lost permission fees to revenues generated by "traditional, reasonable, or 
likely to be developed" licensing markets. See Princeton University Press, 1996 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-17 (quoting American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, Inc., 
60 F.3d 913, 930-31 (2d Cir. 1994)). Consequently, the holding in Princeton University 
Press should not alter the market impact analysis for a Peak claim. See supra notes 67-
69 and accompanying text. 
In Princeton University Press, publishers sued a copying service for copyright in­
fringement for reproducing portions of the publishers '  copyrighted work as part of 
"coursepacks" used by professors to make materials available to the students. The pub­
lishers claimed that the copying service failed to pay a permission fee to the publishers. 
See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *1-2. Finding a negative 
market impact resulting from the loss of permission fees, the court concluded that the 
circularity argument proved too much: 
Imagine that the defendants set up a printing press and made exact reproductions 
- asserting that such reproductions constituted "fair use" - of a book to which 
they did not hold the copyright. Under the defendants' logic it would be circular 
for the copyright holder to argue market harm because of lost copyright revenues, 
since this would assume that the copyright holder had a right to such revenues. 
Princeton University Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *13-14. 
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use of a work negatively impacts the value of the copyrighted work, not 
just that the user's failure to pay royalties causes a loss of revenue to 
which the copyright holder may or may not have b�n entitled in the 
first place. 
2. Lack of Impact on the Relevant Market 
Because ISOs do not compete with OEMs for the sale of operating 
software, market impact, the most significant fair use factor,74 weighs in 
favor of a finding of fair use. Although an ISO competes against an 
OEM in the computer maintenance field, that arena does not comprise 
part of the market for copies of the software. Copying of software into 
RAM by an ISO, unlike copying of copyrightable material in general, 
does not in any way reduce the customer's demand for that software be­
cause the copying is nonproliferative. Even when a copy of software 
exists in RAM, that copy cannot be distributed anywhere else.75 Anyone 
who wants a copy of the software for a different use either would have 
The majority's argument, however, confuses the impact on the market for permis­
sion fees with the impact on the market for, or the value of, the original work. Making 
exact reproductions of a book on a printing press undoubtedly would have a negative 
impact on the market for the book and thus would not qualify as a fair use regardless of 
any impact on permission fees. The problem with the majority's logic in Princeton Uni­
versity Press is that it "would always yield a conclusion that the market had been 
harmed because any fees that a copyright holder could extract from a user if the use 
were found to be unfair would be 'lost' if the use were instead found to be 'fair use.' " 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 29132, at *86 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
Market impact analysis concerns itself with whether the use in question damages the 
value of the original work or damages the value of derivative products such as cour­
sepacks that the copyright holder wishes to market, not whether the use deprives the 
copyright holder of permission fees. See Princeton Univ. Press, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 
29132, at *84-85 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Because permission fees are what should be 
paid if the use is found to be unfair, and consequently should not be paid if the use is 
fair, the question of lost permission fees should not be considered until after the court 
determines whether the use is fair. Significantly, a distinguished group of copyright law 
professors filed an amicus curiae brief in Princeton University Press supporting a find­
ing of fair use for this reason. See L. Ray Patterson, Amicus Advocacy: Brief Amicus 
Curiae of Eleven Copyright Law Professors in Princeton University Press v. Michigan 
Document Services, Inc., 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 183 (1994). 
74. See supra note 40. 
75. For example, the court in Peak suggested that a potential customer "desiring 
to utilize" a program in ROM could "arrange to copy [the software] into RAM" and 
thus avoid purchasing the software. MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 
511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Intl., Inc., 594 F. 
Supp. 617, 622 (C.D. Cal. 1984)). However, any copy of the software in RAM would 
not have an independent existence that could be transferred into permanent form for use 
on the customer's computer. As a result, the customer could not avoid purchasing a 
copy of the software by making a copy of the software in RAM. 
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to obtain it from another source, presumably the OEM, or copy the 
software from long-term memory into another permanent location.76 
In this way, J'eak cases can be distinguished from other computer 
copying cases. For example, in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, the 
court held that downloaders of photographs from a computer bulletin 
board were not entitled to the fair use defense because their ability to 
view the photographs necessarily decreased the market for those pic­
tures.77 Similarly, the court in Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Maphia, refused 
to apply the fair use defense to downloaders of computer game software 
from a computer bulletin board because the ability to use the software 
necessarily diminished the market for sale of the software to the 
downloaders.78 In a Peak case, however, the ISO has no independent in­
terest in buying or licensing the software for its own use. ISOs only 
want to use the software for the benefit of the customer who already 
possesses a licensed copy.79 As opposed to copying a book, which 
would reduce the demand for additional copies of the book, an ISO's 
use of the software when copied into RAM does not reduce the demand 
for the software. 80 
An ISO cannot market its services as an alternative to purchasing 
the software; an ISO offers its services as an alternative to the mainte­
nance services offered by the OEM. If an ISO marketed alternative op­
erating systems or utility software copied from the OEM 's software, 
76. See Carol G. Stovsky, Note, MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.: Us­
ing Copyright Law to Prohibit Unauthorized Use of Computer Software, 56 Omo ST. 
LJ. 593, 608 (1995). This analysis also would apply to copies made on disk or tape for 
archival purposes because such copies are made only as backups in case the computer 
malfunctions during servicing and are destroyed after the maintenance process is com­
plete. See discussion supra note 19. Of course, the analysis should only apply as long as 
the ISO destroys and does not proliferate those copies in a way that supplants the mar­
ket for the original software. The fair use defense would not protect an ISO's prolifera­
tive activities from the reach of copyright law. 
77. See Playboy Enterps., Inc. v. Frena, 839"F. Supp. 1552, 1558-59 (M.D. Fla. 
1993). 
78. See Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Maphia, 857 F. Supp. 679, 688 (N.D. Cal. 1994). 
79. Unlike other copyrighted works such as books that "need not be copied by the 
reader . . .  to be used," computer programs "must be copied to be used by the com­
puter and hence, the user." Stovsky, supra note 76, at 595 (citing RAYMOND T. 
NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 1-103 (2d ed. 1992)). 
80. The analysis would be the same even if the operating system software and util­
ity software were decoupled from each other because the lack of market impact and the 
customer's necessity in using the software to operate the customer's computer success­
fully would remain unchanged. In other words, although the utility/service software 
would no longer be copied automatically into RAM whenever the computer was turned 
on, the copying would still be necessary to perform the maintenance on the computer 
and an ISO's use of the software would not alter the customer's demand for the 
software. 
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such activity clearly would create competition with the OEM for sales 
of the original. However, such activity is impossible when the ISO sim­
ply loads the software into RAM because it transfers the "copy" in 
RAM to any other form of memory; only items in ROM or some other 
form of permanent memory can be copied. 
In this respect, ISO copying of software into RAM for the purpose 
of servicing the computer parallels reverse engineering cases where 
courts have found in favor of fair use. 81 Reverse engineering involves 
the transformation of the machine-readable code of a computer program 
into human-readable code by a programmer in order to understand how 
the program interfaces with a computer and discover the requirements 
for making a program compatible with that computer.82 Courts have 
held that the process of translating computer code into language under­
standable by computer programmers creates a copy of the software.83 
In these cases, courts have found fair use because the defendant's 
use of the software codes through reverse engineering did not coinpete 
directly' with the plaintiff's sales of the software codes.84 In both a Peak 
case and a reverse engmeering case, although copying occurs, the copy­
ing does not create additional marketable copies of the software. Rather, 
it is a necessary step in the use of the software for purposes that do not 
adversely affect the demand for the software.85 Indeed, the existence of 
81. See, e.g., Sega Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992). 
82. See 977 F.2d at 1518-20. 
83. See 977 F.2d at 1518-20; Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). 
84. See 977 F.2d at 1523. 
85. Never theless, the cour t in Triad II held that Peak claims differed from reverse 
engineering cases because the ISO's use is "neither creative nor transformative and 
does not provide the marketplace with new creative works" whereas reverse engineers 
developing entirely new software do inject something creative into the market Triad 
Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1336 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Accolade, 911 F.2d at 1523); see also Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 
569, 579 (1994) (stressing the importance of the transformative nature of the use as a 
strong factor for finding in favor of fair use). However, focusing solely on whether a 
given use is transformative is perilously shortsighted. First ,  a use need not be transform­
ative to be a fair use. For example, the copying of an article by a teacher to use in class, 
one of the examples of fair use listed in 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1994), would not be consid­
ered a transformative use. Second, the cour t in Triad II relied on its inquiry into the 
question of whether the use is transformative as an intermediate step in determining 
market impact of the use. See Triad II, 64 F.3d at 1336. The relevant software market in 
a Peak claim, however, suffers no harm as a result of the ISO's use. Analyzing whether 
the use is transformative as a way of measuring market impact would be a misguided 
enterprise if a lack of market impact had already been established through an indepen­
dent analysis. 
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competition in the service market for a given computer system likely 
will enhance, not suppress, the demand for that system. 86 
B. Purpose of the Use 
Section 107 also directs courts to consider the "purpose and char­
acter of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature 
or is for nonprofit education purposes" when evaluating the fairness of 
a challenged use.87 The Supreme Court has ruled that "every commer­
cial use of copyrighted material" creates a rebuttable presumption of an 
unfair use.88 An ISO's commercial use of operating software thus cre­
ates a presumption of unfair use.89 Nevertheless, despite this negative 
presumption, a commercial use still may constitute a fair use if it has no 
effect on the market for the copyxjghted material.90 Consequently, while 
the purpose of the use factor may not weigh in favor of fair use, it 
should not weigh against fair use either because an ISO's commercial 
gain from the use of the software does not detract in any way from the 
OEM's profits from sales of the software. 
An analysis of the commercial nature of a given use should be 
used to help determine the extent to which the infringing copy "super­
sedes" the original work.91 Courts investigate whether the user stands to 
profit from her exploitation of the copyrighted material in a way that di-
86. See Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 366 
(E.D. Va. 1994) (concluding that an ISO's use likely "enhances the value of the [operat­
ing] software" since the OEM "would lose business in the sale of [its] computers if 
customers could not use ISOs to service" the equipment). 
87. 17  u.s.c. § 107(1)  (1994). 
88. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984); 
see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584; Harper & Row Publishers,  Inc. v. Nation Enterp., 
471 U.S. 539, 562 (1986); Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522 (citing Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. 
Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1 1 52 (9th Cir. 1986)); NIMMER & NIMMER, 
supra note 34, § 13.0S[A][l](c). 
89. The court in Advanced Computer Services concluded that the commercial pur­
pose of an ISO's use of copyrighted software weighed "substantially against" a finding 
of fair use. The court concluded that the ISO's commercial use of copyrighted software 
is "an unfair exploitation of the monopoly privilege that belongs to the holder of the 
copyright" 845 F. Supp. at 365 (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 451). 
90. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 589-95; see also Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522 (hold­
ing that the presumption of unfairness arising from a commercial use "can be rebutted 
by the characteristics of the particular commercial use"). 
91. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. The Supreme Court rejected the proposition 
that a commercial use automatically establishes an unfair use. See 510 U.S. at 584; see 
also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., 
concurring) (although fair use is "presumptively" unavailable where the use is commer­
cial, " 'presumptively' does not mean 'always', and, in any event, the doctrine of fair 
use . • .  can be adapted to new purposes"), affd. by an equally divided Court, 1 16 S. Ct. 
804 (1996). The Supreme Court, quoting Samuel Johnson, has noted that "[n]o man but 
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rectly competes with sales of the copyrighted work.92 If the copying of 
a work only serves as an intermediate stage in the use of that work, and 
therefore any commercial benefit derived from the use is only an indi­
rect result of the copying, the use of the work overcomes the rebuttable 
presumption that commercial uses are unfair.93 
Under these standards, the ISO's use of the software in a Peak 
claim successfully rebuts the presumption of unfairness associated with 
commercial uses.94 An ISO's use does not compete with the OEM for 
sales of the software.95 Rather, the copying of the software only serves 
as an intermediate stage in the use of that work, and any resulting com­
mercial benefit to the copier is an indirect result of the copying. 
C. Nature of the Work 
The next factor under section 107 is "the nature of the copyrighted 
work."96 "[N]ot all copyrighted works are entitled to the same level of 
protection" under fair use analysis.97 Specifically, courts have held that 
a blockhead ever wrote, except for money." Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584 (quoting 3 Bos­
WELL's LIFE OF JOHNSON 19 (G. Hill ed., 1934)). 
92. See Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562; Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Pub­
lishers, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 690 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 500 F.2d 1221 (2nd Cir. 1974). 
93. See Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1522-23. 
94. See 977 F.2d at 1522-23. ISOs also have argued that the purpose of the use 
factor weighs in favor of fair use because the ISOs use of the software provides a pub­
lic benefit See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 
WL 446049, at *11 (N.D. Cal: Mar. 18, 1994). Commercial uses that result in public 
benefit may qualify as fair uses. See Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1523; MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 
677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981). ISOs have claimed that their ability to use copyrighted 
software in a Peak claim benefits customers who own computers using licensed 
software by providing those customers with "a choice and price competition in the ser­
vice and maintenance markets." Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *11. 
Public benefit, though, "typically involves 'the development of art, science, and 
industry . . . and not, as here, the purely financial interests of customers." Advanced 
Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994) (inter­
nal quotation marks omitted). Thus, despite the financial benefits bestowed to customers 
by an ISO's ability to service their computers, courts likely will find that the public 
benefit exception does not apply to Peak claims. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Serv., 
845 F. Supp. at 365 (concluding that the public benefit exception did not apply because 
"customers, having signed license agreements, were on notice that they could not allow 
third parties to use the software"); see also Triad II, 64 F.3d at 1337 (detecting "no ap­
preciable public benefit" arising from enhanced competition in the computer service 
market that would justify a finding of fair use). Nevertheless, an ISO's public benefit 
argument highlights the fact that an ISO's ability to use the software likely serves to en­
hance rather than detract from the software's value. This result bolsters the case that the 
commercial nature of an ISO's use should not weigh against fair use because it does not 
have any detrimental impact on the value of the original work. 
95. See supra text accompanying notes 75-86. 
96. 17 u.s.c. § 107(2) (1994). 
97. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1524. 
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fair use should be applied more freely to the copying of "informa­
tional," "functional," or "factual" works than to "creative" works, be­
cause allowing users to copy more functional works does not threaten 
to undermine the incentives copyright law creates to promote advances 
in the arts and sciences.98 In a Peak claim, the nature of the work 
should weigh in favor of fair use because operating software is prima­
rily a functional work undeserving of a high degree of copyright 
protection. 
Although courts have agreed that operating software is used for a 
functional purpose,99 they are split on the issue of whether computer 
software deserves a higher or lower degree of copyright protection.100 
On the one hand, the recent trend in fair use software cases has been to 
apply a lower degree of protection to computer software, 101 especially 
98. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 1148, 1152-54 
(9th Cir. 1986); Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365 (citing Accolade, 977 
F.2d at 1524 (noting that copyright protection does not extend to the functional aspects 
of a work); N.A.D.A. Serv. Corp. v. Business Data, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 44, 48 (E.D. Va. 
1986). Indeed, because authors would be less likely to open creative works to public re­
view without stronger guarantees of protection for those works, courts have held that 
more creative works deserve greater copyright protection. See Maxtone-Graham v. Burt­
chaell, 631 F. Supp. 1432 (S.D.N.Y.), affd., 803 F.2d 1253 (2d Cir. 1986); NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 34; § 13.05(A][2](a] (citing Hustler Magazine, 796 F.2d 1148); 
Diamond v. Am-Law Corp., 745 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1984); see also Campbell v. Acuff­
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994). This analysis comports with the underlying 
purpose of copyright law. The Constitution provides that copyright law shall serve to 
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Au­
thors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. "To this end, copyright assures the right to their original 
expression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information con­
veyed by a work." Feist Publication, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 
(1991). 
99. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 
WL 446049, at *12-*13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994); Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. 
Supp. at 365. 
100. Compare Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 
1224-25 (3d Cir. 1986) and Digital Communications v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. 
Supp. 449, 457-59 (N.D. Ga. 1987) and Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, 
Inc., 648 F. Supp. 1127, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (extending a high degree of copyright 
protection to all aspects of a computer program, including its functional characteristics) 
with Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st  Cir. 1995), affd. by 
an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct 804 (1996) and Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1524-25 and 
Computer Associates Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992) (extending a 
low degree of copyright protection to computer software, especially to a program's 
more functional aspects). 
101. See Pamela Samuelson, Counterpoint: An Entirely New Legal Regime ls 
Needed, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1995, at 11 (observing that although the "trend in 
caselaw in the mid to late 1980s seemed to 'zig' in favor of an expansive scope of 
copyright protection for programs, the trend in the early 1990s has been to 'zag' toward 
a narrower scope of protection"). Many recent commentators have argued in favor of 
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where the software is primarily a "functional" work.102 In particular, 
the court in Triad I ruled that operating system software is a functional, 
utilitarian work. 103 Other courts have concluded that software deserves a 
high degree of copyright protection because it "is not a mere compila­
tion of existing information . . .  [but] is instead a specially designed and 
crafted work which represents a substantial investment of time and 
labor. " 104 
Nevertheless, because of its functional nature, operating software 
should receive less protection than creative works such as poems or 
novels under fair use analysis. Operating software ensures the effective 
operation of the computer so that it can perform the tasks for which it 
was designed. Operating software, including operating system software 
and utility software, is essentially utilitarian, and it should not merit a 
high enough degree of protection to weigh against a finding of fair 
use.1os 
However, the court in Triad I distinguished between operating sys­
tem software and utility/diagnostic software, providing greater protec­
tion to the latter.106 The court in Triad I, reasoning that the computer 
could operate without utility/service software but could not function 
without operating system software, concluded that diagnostic software 
was not "clearly functional" and deserved greater protection than oper-
lowering the degree of copyright protection for computer software. See Peter S. Menell, 
An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. 
L. REv. 1045 (1989); Frederick R. Warren-Boulton et al., Point: Copyright Protection 
of Software Can Make Economic Sense, COMPUTER LAW., Feb. 1995, at 10. But see 
Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection For Computer Programs, Databases, and 
Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since CONTU?, 106 HAR.v. L. REV. 977 
(1993) (arguing in favor of broader copyright protection for computer software). 
102. Accolade, 977 F.2d at 1524-26; Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *1 1-*13; see 
also Apple Computer, Inc., v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(holding that the method which instructs a computer to perform its operating functions 
is not subject to copyright law protection). "Copyright provides strong but thin protec­
tion to software, absolutely prohibiting piracy by duplication of disks or- unauthorized 
distribution, but not protecting the methods by which software operates." Lionel Sobel, 
quoted in Richard C. Reuben, No Lotus Position for Supreme Court: Experts See Con­
fusion in Wake of Justices' 4-4 Split on Software Copyrights, A.B.A. J. 30 (April 1996). 
103. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *12-*13. 
104. Advanced Computer Serv. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 
356, 365 (E.D. Va. 1994). Courts have often considered the financial investment of 
copyright holders in developing their works when evaluating the nature of the work fac­
tor. See Wainwright Sec., Inc. v. Wall St Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91,  96 (2d Cir. 
1977); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. I.B.M. Corp., 746 F. Supp. 520, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1990). 
105. See David A. Rice, Sega and Beyond: A Beacon for Fair Use Analysis • • •  At 
Least as Far as It Goes, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1 13 1  (1994) (arguing that functional 
software deserves a lower degree of protection against copying under the nature of the 
work analysis). 
106. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *13. 
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ating system software.107 Consequently, the court found the nature of 
the work Wyighed against the fair use of service software because such 
software was not "clearly functional."tos 
The court in Triad I, though, improperly departed from its own 
standards. The court considered operating system software to be "func­
tional" and to deserve a lower degree of protection because of the rela­
tionship between operating system software and "any productive use of 
the computer." 109 Utility software, like operating system software, plays 
an essential role in insuring that the computer functions properly. The 
customer does not purchase a computer to run utility software. Instead, 
the customer purchases a computer to run certain application software 
and buys the utility/service software only to make sure that the com­
puter can continue to run the application software. In other words, util­
ity software ensures that the computer can operate but does not perform 
the functions for which the computer was designed. It is not an "elec­
tive" component because without it the computer could not continue to 
function. 
Because it is designed as an essential component in ensuring that 
the computer operates properly and does not perform any "productive 
use of the computer," utility/service software should receive the same, 
lower level of protection afforded to operating system software. Operat­
ing software, including both operating system software and util­
ity/diagnostic software, is supportive of the computer's main functions, 
such as managing memory, checking for and displaying errors, listing 
the files on a disk, formatting a diskette, and coordinating processing 
functions.110 It does not perform the primary creative functions for 
which the computer was purchased.111 
107. See 1994 WL 446049, at *13. The court also noted that utility/service 
software requires operating system software and not vice versa. See 1994 WL 446049, 
at *13. 
108. 1994 WL 446049, at *13. 
109. 1994 WL 446049, at *13. 
110. See CHRISTOPH & SMITH, supra note 9, at 114. 
111. This is not to say that utility software does not deserve copyright protection 
because it is primarily a functional work. Rather, this Note argues that in a Peak claim, 
the fair use defense should apply because operating software, including both operating 
system and utility software, is primarily functional in nature and thus deserves a lower 
degree of protection in the fair use analysis. &e Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 
49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) (Boudin, J., concurring) ("Utility does not bar copy­
right . . .  but it alters the calculus."), affd. by an equally divided Court, 116 S. Ct. 804 
(1996). 
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The remaining factor listed in section 107 is "the amount and sub­
stantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a 
whole."112 Courts have held that "[c]opying an entire work weighs 
against a finding of fair use."113 Because an ISO copies the entirety of 
the program into RAM, the extent of the copying factor would seem to 
weigh against a finding of fair use if mechanically applied.114 However,_ 
courts have held that the extent of the copying factor is not dispositive 
of the fair use issue whep. the user has no viable alternative but to copy 
the work in order to achieve a use that is otherwise fair. 115 As a result, 
the extent of the copying should not preclude application of the fair use 
defense because the software is loaded into RAM automatically by the 
computer as a necessary function of the computer's operation and not 
because the ISO intends to make a copy of the software. The ISO's 
copying of operating software into RAM is not an exploitation of pro­
tected creative expression, but a necessary use of the "functional" as­
pects of a program. 
II. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING FAIR USE 
This Part maintains that courts should apply the fair use defense to 
Peak claims because the policy considerations raised by the impact of 
the Peak decision support a finding of fair use. Specifically, application 
of the fair use defense will prevent OEMs from establishing a strangle­
hold on the market for computer maintenance by bringing Peak claims 
against ISOs competing for service work. 
Courts apply the fair use defense when the broader ramifications of 
failing to do so conflict with the purposes behind copyright law, al­
lowing courts the ability to tailor the application of copyright law to 
meet new conditions and realities.116 The four statutory fair use factors 
1 12. 17 u.s.c. § 107(3) (1994). 
1 13. Advanced Computer Servs., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 365 
(E.D. Va. 1994) (citing McGowan v. Cross, No. 92-1480, No. 92-1584, 1993 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 9134, at *4-*5 (4th Cir. Apr. 22, 1993)). 
1 14. See Advanced Computer Servs., 845 F. Supp. at 365-66 (arguing that copying 
the entire program into RAM weighs against fair use); Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern 
Express Co., No. C92 1539-FMS, 1994 WL 446049, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994). 
1 15. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586-87 (1994); Sega 
Enterps. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1526-27 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that 
wholesale reproduction of a copyrighted work may be permitted as a fair use when a 
user can only make use of the work by copying all of it); see also NIMMER & 
NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[D][4]. 
1 16. Any evaluation of the fair use defense must be circumscribed by the equita­
ble demands of the fair use doctrine and guided by an understanding of the underlying 
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serve only as examples to aid the courts' analyses of whether a given 
use is fair; they do not serve as an "exhaustive enumeration" nor do 
they provide "a rule that may automatically be applied in deciding 
whether any particular use is 'fair.' " 1 17 Fair use analysis under section 
107 "is not to be simplified with bright-line rules, for the statute, like 
the doctrine it recognizes, calls for case-by-case analysis." 1 18 
The importance of the Ninth Circuit's holding in Peak cannot be 
overstated. Under the guise of copyright law, the Peak decision allows 
OEMs to reserve "an exclusive right to service the hardware on which 
the software runs," effectively extending their copyright monopoly on 
the software they produce into the computer service market.119 Because 
an ISO must be able to tum on a computer while servicing it, 120 denying 
purpose of copyright law. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 
U.S. 539, 552, 560 (1986). Fair use enables courts to avoid stifling "the very creativ­
ity" copyright law seeks to foster by protecting uses of copied material that further the 
goals of copyright law. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577 (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 
207, 236 (1990)); see also Iowa State Univ. Res. Found., Inc. v. Am. Broadcasting Co., 
621 F.2d 57, 60 (2d Cir. 1980). Courts rely on the fair use doctrine to maintain a bal­
ance between favoring competition and ensuring the protection of an author's creative 
labor. See Computer Assocs. Intl., Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 702, 7 1 1  (2d Cir. 
1992). As a result, courts strive to avoid any mechanical application of the fair use de­
fense when faced with new situations arising from technological developments. See 
1\ventieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (arguing that 
"[w]hen technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the Copyright 
Act must be construed in light of [its] basic purpose"); see also Triad I, 1994 WL 
446049, at *7 (holding that "when adopting the principles of copyright law to new cir­
cumstances, the development of the law is best served by attention to [the] underlying 
principles [of copyright law], rather than by fruitless attempts to fit proverbial square 
pegs into round holes."). 
1 17. NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 34, § 13.05[A). "The factors listed in 17 
U.S.C. §107 are preceded by the words 'shall include,' and use of the term 'including' 
is defined as 'illustrative and not limitative.' " Id. § 13.05[A] n.27 (quoting 17 U.S. C. 
§§ 101 & 107; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577); see also New Era Publications Intl., ApS v. 
Henry Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 588 (2d Cir. 1989) (Oakes, C. J., concurring) (empha­
sizing the "nonexclusive" nature of the four factors). 
1 l8. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 577; see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552 & 560. 
1 19. Stovsky, supra note 76, at 600. The ruling in Peak effectively enables OEMs 
to monopolize the computer service market by enforcing copyright protection on com­
puter operating system and utility/service software transferred to customers under re­
strictive licensing agreements. In MAJ Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 51 l 
(9th Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 1 1 4  S. Ct 671 (1994), the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court's grant of a permanent injunction to MAI (the OEM) that prohibited Peak 
Computer (the ISO) from servicing MAI computers running software licensed exclu­
sively to MAI customers. See 17 U.S. C. § 502(a) (1994) (authorizing courts to grant in­
junctive relief "to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright"). 
120. See discussion supra note 20. 
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the availability of the fair use defense to ISOs significantly undermines 
their ability to compete in the computer maintenance market.121 
Despite the serious antitrust implications raised by this type of li­
censing scheme, 122 an OEM will remain exempt from antitrust proceed­
ings under the Peak doctrine because Peak gives the OEM copyright 
protection and thus court-sanctioned unilateral control over the com-
121. See Ronald S. Katz & Janet S. Arnold, Fair Use of Operating System 
Software: Square Pegs in Round Holes?, COMPUTER LAW., May 1994, at 1 ;  Jeff A. 
MacDaniel, Selected Recent Developments in Copyright Law, 3 Tux. INTELL. PROP. 
LJ. 57, 60 (1994) (stating that the decision in Peak has "cast doubt on the viability of 
the independent service organization (ISO) industry"); Richard L. Goff, Can Software 
Copyrights Restrict Related Competition?, COMPUTER LAW., Oct 1994, at 9 (arguing 
that a "combination of copyright protection and well-drafted software license limita­
tions may lawfully accomplish some restrictions on competition" in the computer ser­
vice market); Levin, supra note 20, at 671-73 & n.167. 
122. If copyright protection applies, OEMs clearly have the unfettered ability to 
preclude ISOs from performing computer maintenance by refusing to sell them software 
licenses without violating antitrust laws. See infra note 123. However, if loading 
software into RAM by an ISO did not create a "copy" of the software or did not con­
stitute an infringing copy because the fair use defense applied, any attempt by an OEM 
to force the customer to hire only
. 
the OEM for computer maintenance likely would run 
afoul of antitrust law. 
In order successfully to preclude customers from hiring ISOs to perform computer 
maintenance without the benefit of copyright protection, an OEM would need to argue 
that the restrictive licenses prohibited customers from using anyone other than the OEM 
to service the customer's computer. Such a reading, though, likely would render the 
contract unenforceable as an illegal tying of the sale or licensing of software to an ex­
clusive contract for the OEM to perform computer service on computers using the 
software, a practice the Supreme Court held to be a violation of antitrust law in East­
man Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, Inc., 1 12 S. Ct 2072 (1992) (holding that 
an OEM's attempt to restrain ISO competition in the computer service market by refus­
ing to sell spare parts necessary for computer maintenance implicated antitrust prohibi­
tions against monopolistic activities). Because courts consider software licensing and 
computer maintenance to constitute two separate markets, see Service & Training, Inc. 
v. Data Gen., Inc., 963 F.2d 680, 684 (4th Cir. 1992); Advanced Computer Serv. of 
Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp., 845 F. Supp. 356, 368 (E.D. Va. 1994), an OEM's at­
tempt to use restrictive licensing agreements to prevent competition in the service mar­
ket would be highly susceptible to an antitrust tying claim if copyright law did not serve 
to prohibit such competition. 
For a more in depth discussion of the antitrust issues raised by an OEM's attempt 
to prevent ISOs from entering the computer repair business see David Bender, ISO Use 
of System Software: Copyright Infringement? . . . Or Antitrust Violation, in INTELLEC­
TUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST 1994, at 107 (PLI Pat, Copyrights Trademarks, and Lit­
erary Property Course Handbook Series No. 390, 1994); Anthony L. Clapes, Software, 
Copyright and Competition: The Use of Antitrust Theory to Undercut Copyright Protec­
tion for Computer Programs, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ANTITRUST: 1995, at 553 
(PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series No. 
414, 1995); Barry Reingold, Lower Court Decisions in the Aftennath of Kodak, COM­
PUTER LAW., Aug. 1994, at 21; Wall & Crompton, supra note 43. 
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puter maintenance process for computers manufactured by that OEM.123 
Such a result clearly runs counter to the underlying purpose of copy­
right law by granting copyright holders the benefits of copyright protec­
tion in a market for an uncopyrightable commodity, the process of ser­
vicing computers.124 Precisely for this reason, numerous commentators 
have sharply criticized the Peak decision as an inappropriate expansion 
of copyright protection stemming from a misunderstanding of how 
computers function and a misreading of congressional intent.125 In spite 
of this infinnity, courts have consistently reaffirmed the holding in 
Peak.126 
123. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 36 F.3d 1 147 (1st Cir. 
1994) (ruling that an OEM could refuse to allow ISOs access to the OEM's copyrighted 
service software without violating antitrust law because copyright law does not compel 
an OEM to share software with its competitors); Service & Training, 963 F.2d at 690 
(selective licensing of a copyrighted work is not evidence of an illegal tying arrange­
ment); In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 910 F. Supp. 1537, 1542 (D. Kan. 
1995) ("Generally, the exercise of one's rights under the Patent and Copyright Acts, 
even by refusing to license or sell one's protected work to a competitor," does not auto­
matically create an antitrust violation); Advanced Computer Serv., 845 F. Supp. at 368-
70 (denying an ISO's antitrust claims against the OEM on the grounds that copyright 
protection gives the OEM a valid monopoly). Because servicing computers necessarily 
involves the copying of protected software, OEMs can restrict an ISO 's maintenance ac­
tivities under copyright law without violating antitrust law, in effect collapsing the oth­
erwise distinct software and service markets. See supra note 122. As a result, an OEM 
could outright refuse to sell ISOs licensing rights to service customer computers without 
violating antitrust law despite the general proposition that copyright law should not be 
used "to support a tie over . • .  noncopyrighted products." Tricom, Inc. v. Elec. Data 
Sys. Corp., 902 F. Supp. 741, 744 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (citing Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 704 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
124. Cf. Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523-24 (9th Cir. 
1992) (holding that "an attempt to monopolize the market by making it impossible for 
others to compete runs counter to the statutory purpose of promoting creative expres­
sion and cannot constitute a strong equitable basis for resisting the invocation of the fair 
use doctrine"). Indeed, at the trial that followed the decision in Triad I, Triad (the 
OEM) admitted that the licensing scheme was employed as a strategy to protect Triad's 
market in the service market, not as a means to protect its ability to control the prolifer­
ation and distribution of the software. See C.R. 387, E.R. 212; C.R. 396, E.R. 371-74, 
379-80 (cited in Appellant's Opening Brief at 31,  Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern 
Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995)). This result is contrary to the strong concern 
for the necessity of maintaining competition in the service market between ISOs and 
OEMs expressed by the Supreme Court in Eastman Kodak, 1 12 S. Ct. at 2072 nn.18 & 
21. 
125. See, e.g., Arriola, supra note 3; Levin, supra note 20. 
126. See Triad II, 64 F.3d 1330; NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, Inc., 45 
F.3d 231 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 1 16 S. Ct. 2249 (1995); Roeslin v. Dist. of Columbia, 
921 F. Supp. 793 (D.D.C. 1995); In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litigation, 910 F. 
Supp. 1537; Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Communication Serv., Inc., 
907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Tricom, 902 F. Supp. at 745; Advanced Computer 
Serv., 845 F. Supp. 356; Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., No. C92 1539-
FMS, 1994 WL 446049 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 1994). In addition, the Peak doctrine is un-
December 1996) Note - Fair Use of Computer Software 683 
Without the benefit of the fair use defense, courts would be forced 
into the ludicrous position of arguing that copyright infringement occurs 
in one scenario where the ISO performs the activity itself and not in an­
other where the customer performs the exact same activity with the ISO 
standing over the customer's shoulder telling the customer what to 
do.127 The Seventh Circuit in NLFC, Inc. v. Devcom Mid-America, 
Inc.,12il refused to apply the Peak doctrine where an ISO used a "dumb 
terminal" to perform computer service.129 A dumb terminal consists of 
a keyboard, an input device, a monitor screen, and an output device, 
and though lacking any independent memory such as ROM or RAM, a 
user on a dumb terminal still can send commands to the live computer 
hooked up to the dumb terminal and view the results of those com­
mands.130 In NLFC, the ISO used a dumb terminal connected by phone 
line to the customer's computer to service the computer. Even though 
the ISO in reality still performed the service, caused the software to be 
copied into RAM, and then used the software in RAM, the court found 
that the holding in Peak did not apply to the use of dumb terminals.131 
While employing a dumb terminal scheme or having the customer 
turn on the computer and punch keys at the ISO's direction would allow 
ISOs to avoid copyright infringement, a customer may not be too inter­
ested in hiring an ISO when doing so would require the presence and 
attention of the customer any time the ISO needed to turn on a com­
puter or run a program. Causing such significant inconveniences for 
customers likely would do as much to foreclose ISO access to the com­
puter service market as would a strict application of the Peak doctrine. 
Application of the fair use defense to a Peak claim would protect ISOs 
from the unfair exploitation of copyright law by OEMs while avoiding 
the necessity for focusing on nonsensical factual distinctions such as 
likely to be overruled by the force of international obligations. International conventions 
relating to copyright law to which the United States is a party are silent on the issue of 
what constitutes the malting of a copy of computer software. See STEPHEN M. STEW­
ART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS §§ 12.12-13 (2d 
ed. 1989). Most notably, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artis­
tic Works, Paris Act, July 24, 1971, art. IX, para. 2, S. TREATY Doc. No. 99-27, 99th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 37 (1986), 828 U.N.T.S. 221, allows a member country to determine 
what constitutes the malting of an unauthorized copy under that country's copyright 
laws. 
127. See Triad I, 1994 WL 446049, at *9; see also supra note 32. 
128. 45 F.3d 231 (7th Cir. 1995). 
129. See 45 F.3d at 231. 
130. See 45 F.3d at 231. 
131. The court reasoned that since the copy of the software made into RAM was 
created by the customer on the customer's computer, the ISO did not copy the software 
even though the ISO was the one using the copy of the software via the dumb terminal. 
See 45 F.3d at 231. 
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whether the customer turned on the computer or whether maintenance 
was performed through a dumb terminal.132 
Because the holding in Peak allows OEMs to extend the reach of 
copyright protection beyond the scope supported by the goals of copy­
right law, ISOs should be able to rely on fair use as a defense against a 
Peak claim.133 Otherwise, OEMs receive a de facto copyright on the un­
copyrightable process of servicing computers by licensing rather than 
selling operating software to their customers. 
CONCLUSION 
"Applying copyright law to computer programs is like assembling 
a jigsaw puzzle whose pieces do not quite fit." 134 In order to insure the 
most effective application of copyright law in the relatively new arena 
of computer software litigation, courts should strive to remain faithful 
to the fundamental aims of copyright law and the equitable principles 
underlying the fair use doctrine. Courts should allow ISOs to rely on 
the fair use defense in a Peak claim because the fair use factors on bal­
ance weigh in favor of a finding of fair use: the commercial purpose of 
an ISO's use of the operating software is offset by the fact that the use 
has no negative market impact, the operating software is primarily a 
functional and not a creative work, and an ISO has no viable alternative 
but to copy the entirety of a computer's operating software when turn­
ing on the computer. Such a decision also would make sense on policy 
grounds: courts should not allow OEMs to monopolize unfairly the 
132. Application of the fair use doctrine in a Peak claim would not infringe on an 
OEM's legitimate use of software licensing agreements such as ensuring that customers 
have to upgrade the software each time the OEM releases a new version. However, con­
sidering an ISO's use of the software to be fair would protect customers and ISOs from 
the improper use of licensing agreements designed to prohibit competition in the com­
puter maintenance market In addition, the fair use defense in Peak claims would allow 
the continued application of the Peak doctrine in cases where it may make sense, such 
as prohibiting third parties from loading data or pictures into RAM that can be used as 
a substitute to the purchase of the original (i.e. reading a book displayed in RAM that is 
stored in ROM instead of buying an additional copy). For a discussion of the potential 
implications of copyright law on the growing number of works accessible through com­
puters that can be perceived in RAM see Jane C. Ginsbutg, Putting Cars on the "Infor­
mation Superhighway": Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. 
L. REv. 1466 (1995). 
133. The courts that have held otherwise demonstrate what one commentator de­
scribed as the process by which "a series of legal determinations, each somewhat de­
fensible as a mechanical application of statutory language and case law precedent, can 
yield a result that is plainly at odds with the policies behind the statute it seeks to ap­
ply." Johnson, supra note 31, at 328. 
134. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Intl., Inc., 49 F.3d 807, 819 (1st Cir. 1995) 
(Boudin, J., concurring), affd. by an equally divided Court, 1 16 S. Ct. 804 (1996). 
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computer service market by relying on copyright protection to stifle 
competition in the related but uncopyrightable field of computer 
maintenance. 
Critics may argue that using the fair use defense to avoid the im­
plications of the decision in Peak is nothing more than a subterfuge, an 
attempt to circumvent a controversial ruling by relying on a convenient 
but inappropriate doctrine. However, because the issues raised by a 
Peak claim involve equitable claims about the valid scope of copyright 
protection on software and the fairness of extending that protection to 
the uncopyrightable work of servicing computers, fair use is an appro­
priate defense. Fair use serves as a safety valve to avoid the conse­
quences of strictly applying copyright law in certain situations when 
such an application would contravene the fundamental purposes of cop­
yright law.135 Thus, fair use should be available as a defense to a Peak 
claim to offset the inequitable results that would flow from a strict ap­
plication of the Peak doctrine. 
135. See Rice, supra note 105, at 1 131 (arguing that fair use is an appropriate doc­
trine to avoid the unfair results of strictly applying copyright law when dealing with 
computer software). 
